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WHAT DO THE CHINESE WANT?

THE EDITORS

IF LABOR WINS...

RALPH MILIBAND

ALUMINUM PROFITS AND CARIBBEAN PEOPLE

PHILIP RENO

Communism As An Ideal PAUL M. SWEEZY

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CONTENTS

VOLUME FIFTEEN NUMBER SIX OCTOBER 1963

REVIEW OF THE MONTH: What Do the Chinese Want? 289
ALUMINUM PROFITS AND CARIBBEAN PEOPLE by Philip Reno 305
A NOTE ON WORLD ECONOMIC INEQUALITY by Henry Haase 315
IF LABOR WINS by Ralph Miliband 318
COMMUNISM AS AN IDEAL by Paul M. Sweezy 329
MILLS AND RADICAL POLITICS by Lawrence Goldman 341
WORLD EVENTS by Scott Nearing 344

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NOTES FROM THE EDITORS

The latest word on MR Press books now in production is that both Gordon Lewis's *Puerto Rico: Freedom and Power in the Caribbean* and Cedric Belfrage's *The Man at the Door with the Gun* will be ready to be mailed out to pre-publication buyers at the end of November. *Puerto Rico,* as we told you in last month's issue, will be a 640-page book, the longest and most expensive MR Press has ever published, and it will have to be priced accordingly—probably at $10. To MR readers, however, we are offering it at a prepublication price of $5. This is by far the most comprehensive assessment of Puerto Rico's past and present yet to be written, and we believe it will be indispensable to all who have a serious interest in that country and its relations to the United States. Please be sure to send in your order at the prepublication price before it is too late.

Belfrage's *The Man at the Door* is a lively political travelogue of Latin America, a good introduction to the region whether you are planning a trip there or not. Here, too, you can save handsomely by ordering now. Price after publication has been tentatively set at $4. Until then it is yours for only $2.50.

Alonso Aguilar's pamphlet, *Latin America and the Alliance for Progress,* will be ready for distribution by the time this reaches you. It is an authoritative analysis by one of Mexico's leading economists. Price—50 cents.

The annual appeal of Monthly Review Associates went out early in September, and the first week's returns were more than 15 percent ahead of last year. We are naturally delighted at this indication of readers' confidence and support, but we will have to keep fingers crossed for a while yet. It is possible that many readers have by now got into the habit

(continued on inside back cover)

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WHAT DO THE CHINESE WANT?

The recent trend of events in the world socialist movement is profoundly disturbing. The July talks between the Soviet and Chinese Communist Parties were apparently a complete failure. And the charges and counter-charges which have since been flying back and forth between Moscow and Peking are becoming increasingly acrimonious and serious.

The Chinese say that the Soviet Union broke a whole series of promises and agreements to help them develop their economy and acquire their own nuclear defense capability. The nuclear test-ban treaty they interpret as a surrender to imperialism and the first step in the direction of the formation of a *de facto* alliance between the Soviet Union and the Western powers against China.

The Russians for their part charge that the Chinese believe world socialism can only be built on the ruins of a thermonuclear war, and that they are therefore in favor of an atomic arms race and are doing everything within their power to push the Soviet Union into a collision course with the United States.

These are accusations of a kind one normally expects to come from mortal enemies. When they are hurled at each other by countries bound together by a solemn treaty of mutual military and economic assistance, how is it possible to avoid the conclusion that the alliance itself is in real and present danger of dissolution?

What would the end of the Sino-Soviet alliance mean?

Until recently, we had hoped and believed that it would never be necessary to ask this question. But now, obviously, it must be asked. And since the nature of the answer depends very largely on the probable reaction in the United States to the end of the alliance, we Americans can perhaps claim to have something to say which even the Russians and the Chinese would do well to pay heed to.

We start with the assumption, which we are completely

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convinced is true, that the American ruling class, supported now and probably for a long time to come by the great majority of the American people, is capable of taking literally any action that it considers essential to the preservation of its own existence. By this we mean, not its existence as a collection of men and women but its existence as a privileged minority in a social system based on the exploitation not only of its own workers but of those of as much as possible of the rest of the world as well. To use its own favorite ideological language, the American ruling class will do whatever it considers necessary and appropriate to defend the Free World and preserve the American Way of Life. To these ends it has built up an incredibly destructive arsenal of nuclear weapons and associated delivery systems. It showed at Hiroshima and Nagasaki that it does not scruple to use these weapons for strategic and political purposes even when its existence is not threatened. There is no reason whatever to assume that there would be any greater reluctance to use them in the future. On one condition of course—that the expected gains exceed the expected losses.

The losses which would be incurred as a result of further use of atomic weapons would be of two kinds—purely military from the retaliation of the attacked country, and political from the defection of allies and the alienation of public opinion at home and abroad. Now it is clear that ever since Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the calculations of responsible United States leaders have indicated a negative balance from use of nuclear weapons. The weights assigned to the factors involved have varied. In the early postwar years, the temptation to use the A-bomb against the Soviet Union was offset by fear of the opprobrium which would attach to aggression against a recent, and badly damaged, ally; by lack of sufficient bombs to carry out a decisive attack; and by knowledge that the Red Army could quickly make most of Europe and Asia its hostage. Later, when the Soviet Union developed its own bombs, the fear of retaliation entered the picture and has certainly grown in relative importance ever since.

There have thus been powerful considerations against the use of nuclear weapons during the whole postwar period.

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Nevertheless, it is known that on at least two occasions there was extremely strong pressure from within the government to go ahead and use them anyway. The first was during the Korean War, the second at the time of the impending fall of Dienbienphu. It is significant that the location on both occasions was in Asia close to the borders of China. And there can be little doubt that the ultimate decision not to use nuclear weapons was in each case largely motivated by fear that a chain reaction might be touched off, involving first China and then China's ally the Soviet Union. If it had not been for this strictly military consideration, it is quite possible, perhaps even probable, that A-bombs would long since have been used by American imperialism in its desperate efforts to establish control over the Asian continent. What prevented this from happening then and has made it increasingly unlikely since, has been the Sino-Soviet military alliance backed up by the growing nuclear retaliatory power of the Soviet Union.

Against this background, it is perfectly clear that the abrogation of the Sino-Soviet alliance would lead to a fundamental reappraisal of the situation by the American ruling class. The chances that A-bombs could be used in Asia, and especially against China, without incurring Soviet retaliation would be enormously increased. And this would happen at the very time when the temptation to do so will in any case be rising to an all-time high.

It is very important to be quite clear about this last point. No one doubts that China will have its own bomb in the relatively near future—two or three years at the outside, perhaps much sooner. But it takes a lot longer than that to become a real nuclear power with a fully developed capacity to retaliate against an initial attack. During the interval between production of the first bomb and the development of a full-fledged deterrent capacity, a country is peculiarly vulnerable to what used to be called a preventive war and nowadays is referred to by a variety of less disagreeable euphemisms in the literature of nuclear strategy.

Now it is no secret that the United States nuclear arsenal has been built up with a view to its potential use in a pre-

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ventive war.* Nor can there be any doubt that the reason the preventive warriors have up to now always been voted down in the highest councils of the government has been a well founded respect for Soviet retaliatory power. With the build-up of this power in the last few years, the strength of the argument for preventive war against the Soviet Union has dwindled, and it is probably safe to say that this particular menace has by now all but disappeared.

But that doesn't mean that the doctrine of preventive war is dead. Far from it. Let the protection of the Soviet deterrent be removed from China—and that is what the abrogation of the alliance would mean—and the doctrine would certainly spring to life again with unprecedented vigor. This is not the place for a discussion of the probable outcome of a preventive war against China. Suffice it to say that scientist friends, men who are unalterably opposed to any and every use of nuclear weapons, have told us that in their considered opinion it would not be unrealistic for the United States to aim at completely wrecking the Chinese economy and destroying its military potential for the foreseeable future. This would probably involve severe fall-out in Japan and some other areas adjoining China, but the likely effects in the United States itself would not be serious enough to weigh in the balance of military considerations. If this is the view of sober non-military-minded scientists, one can easily imagine how glowingly the preventive warriors would paint—indeed probably already are painting—the prospects of a quick nuclear solution to the twin problems of Chinese power and Asian social revolution.

We are not implying that the abrogation of the Sino-Soviet alliance would result in an immediate nuclear attack on China. But we do believe it would open a period during which the advocates of preventive war against China would steadily gain in numbers and strength. (It should be remembered in this connection that the war would not have to start with a series of nuclear strikes but could be worked up gradually out of the war in South Vietnam, the Sino-Indian border dispute, a renewed conflict in Korea, or some future Asian crisis situa-

* See "The Menace of Preventive War," *MR*, April 1962.

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tion.) Given the intensity of feeling in the United States about China and the well founded fear that the Chinese Revolution is establishing a pattern for the underdeveloped countries of the world to follow and emulate, it is surely well within the bounds of possibility that the preventive war party would get the upper hand and commit the United States to the most monstrous and ghastly crime in all history.

It may be argued that the hope of the American ruling class to keep a nuclear war against China from spreading into a world holocaust would in any case be vain, that the Russians would willy nilly become involved, and that the United States itself would finally be destroyed by its own criminal folly. It could well be so. We very much doubt, however, that any thing less solid and precise than the Sino-Soviet alliance could persuade our preventive warriors. Nothing, it seems clear to us, could be more dangerous, not only to world peace but to the whole future of mankind, than a breach in this alliance at a time when the Chinese are still a long way from being able to counter the threat of an American nuclear attack with an atomic deterrent of their own. What is needed now, indeed, is a reaffirmation and strengthening of the alliance as the clearest and most effective warning to the American ruling class against playing with atomic fire.

If this reasoning is correct, it means that the country which would be most immediately threatened with disaster should the alliance be dissolved, or possibly even if the alliance should only appear in American eyes to be seriously undermined, would be China.* In the longer run, to be sure, neither the Soviet Union nor the United States could escape the catastrophic consequences of atomic war in Asia, but it

* The way the American mind works in this connection is indicated by the following remark which appeared in the summary of the preceding week's news in the *New York Times's* "News of the Week" section on August 25th. Referring to South Vietnam, the *Times* editor stated: "If the U.S. were certain Soviet Russia would not back Communist China if a showdown were forced in Southeast Asia, the strategic problem for the U.S. might be fairly simple. But Soviet policy in Southeast Asia has been ambiguous and, despite the Sino-Soviet split, there is uncertainty in the West about what course Moscow would adopt if U.S. and Chinese Communist power met head-on."

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still remains true that it is the Chinese who are and for a long time will be directly under the gun. It therefore seems to us inescapable that China has the heaviest responsibility for reversing the present alarming trend of events and the greatest incentive to work for the maximum possible strengthening of the alliance with the Soviet Union.

If they were to adopt this course, would the Chinese have to abandon their own distinctive political and ideological positions and fall in line behind the Soviet Union? We see no reason whatever to jump to this conclusion. Ever since Mao Tse-tung's accession to power in the Chinese Communist Party, the Chinese leadership has gone its own way regardless of the views and directives of Moscow. On basic issues, moreover, Mao and his colleagues were right. History proved it, and eventually Moscow had to recognize it. Why can't the Chinese follow essentially the same course now, confident that once again history will prove them right?

We think they can and should. In order to see what would be involved and why the Chinese have little to fear from putting their views to the test of history, we must recall what the dispute in the Communist world is really about.

We can pass over the most frequently and emphatically reiterated Soviet charges that the Chinese believe socialism can spread only through world war and are therefore opposed to disarmament and the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems. To be sure, if these charges were true, they would be more than ample to explain the dispute and to account for its depth and bitterness. But one has only to read any one of the Chinese statements of their own position to realize that these charges are not true.* They are part of the Soviet propaganda campaign against China—very effective with those who believe them but entirely devoid of explanatory value. The real issues in the dispute have to do with (1) the right method to defeat imperialism (an objective which both

* At the time of writing, the latest, and perhaps the clearest, of these statements is the letter of the Chinese Central Committee to the Soviet Central Committee, dated June 14. This letter is printed in full in the *New York Times* of July 5th.

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parties consider to be not only desirable but in the long run essential to the guaranteeing of world peace), and (2) the course to be followed by socialist countries in the historical epoch between successful revolution and the final achievement of communism. Here we will confine attention to the first of these issues, partly for space reasons but also because it seems clearly to be the more urgent and in a real sense to dominate the dispute as a whole.

The Chinese position on the defeat of imperialism is succinctly stated in Section 8 of the letter of June 14th:

> The various types of contradictions in the contemporary world are concentrated in the vast areas of Asia, Africa, and Latin America; these are the most vulnerable areas under imperialist rule and the storm centers of world revolution dealing direct blows at imperialism.
>
> The national democratic revolutionary movement in these areas and the international socialist revolutionary movement are the two great historical currents of our time.
>
> The national democratic revolutionary struggle of the people in these areas is an important component of the contemporary proletarian world revolution.
>
> The anti-imperialist revolutionary struggles of the people in Asia, Africa, and Latin America are pounding and undermining the foundations of the rule of imperialism and colonialism, old and new, and are now a mighty force in defense of world peace.
>
> In a sense, therefore, the whole cause of the international proletarian revolution hinges on the outcome of the revolutionary struggles of the people of these areas, who constitute the overwhelming majority of the world's population.
>
> Therefore, the anti-imperialist struggle of the people in Asia, Africa, and Latin America is definitely not merely a matter of regional significance but one of overall importance for the whole cause of proletarian world revolution.

To this, the Russians reply in the letter of July 14th, addressed by the Central Committee of the CPUSSR to the organs and members of the Party, as follows:

> Yet another important question is that of the relationship between the struggle of the international working class and the

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national liberation movement of the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

The international revolutionary working class movement, represented today by the world system of socialism and the Communist Parties of the capitalist countries, and the national liberation movement of the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America —these are the great forces of our epoch. The correct coordination among them constitutes one of the main requisites for victory over imperialism.

How do the Chinese comrades solve this question? This is seen from their new "theory," according to which the main contradiction of our time is, you see, contradiction not between socialism and imperialism, but between the national liberation movement and imperialism. The decisive force in the struggle against imperialism, the Chinese comrades hold, is not the world struggle of socialism, not the struggle of the international working class, but again the national liberation movement.

In this way the Chinese comrades, apparently, wish to win in the easiest way popularity among the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. But let nobody be deceived by this "theory."

Whether the Chinese theoreticians want it or not, this theory essentially means the isolation of the national liberation movement from the international working class and its offspring—the world system of socialism. But this would have constituted a tremendous danger to the national liberation movement itself.

Indeed, could the numerous peoples of Asia have won, despite all their heroism and selflessness, if the October Revolution and then the formation of the world system of socialism, had not shaken imperialism to the very foundation, had not undermined the forces of the colonialists? . . .

The Marxists-Leninists always stress the epochal significance of the national liberation movement and its great future, but they regard as one of the main requisites for its further victories solid alliance and cooperation with the countries of the world system of socialism as the main force in the struggle against imperialism, the solid alliance with the labor movement in the capitalist countries. . . .

The goals of the working class and the Communist Parties in the national liberation movement lie in carrying to the end the tasks of the anti-imperialist democratic revolution in the development and consolidation of the national front, based on the

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alliance with the peasantry and the patriotically minded national bourgeoisie, in the preparation of conditions for the setting up of a state of the national democracy and transition to the non-capitalist road of development.

These statements by the Chinese and Soviet Communist Parties evidently reflect profoundly different conceptions of the twin historical processes of imperialist decline and socialist advance. The Chinese think in terms of a break-up of imperialism from within—through the revolt of the exploited countries which lie at the base of the system. Conversely, socialist expansion takes place as anti-imperialist revolutions pass over into socialist revolutions and the lands defecting from imperialism enter the world socialist system.

The Russian view, in sharp contrast, assigns an altogether passive role to the exploited countries within the imperialist system. For them, the main, the decisive anti-imperialist force is the world socialist system. After that comes the working-class movements in the developed capitalist countries. By weakening imperialism, these forces prepare conditions under which national liberation movements in the exploited lands can emerge and eventually lead the peoples into the "non-capitalist road of development." The Soviet view, in other words, envisages the decline of imperialism as resulting from a confrontation of the two systems, and the liberation of colonial and semi-colonial lands as a by-product of this confrontation.

Why, it may be asked, should the confrontation of the systems result in the progressive weakening of imperialism? One possible answer would be because it will involve wars between the systems, and socialism is better able to survive such wars than capitalism. But the Russians' insistance on peaceful co-existence of states with different social systems—which they believe to be not only desirable but also attainable—obviously precludes their giving this answer. Instead, they assign decisive importance to the effects of peaceful competition between the systems. Thus we read in the July 14th letter:

The nature and substance of the world revolutionary process in the modern epoch is determined by the merging into one stream

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of the struggle against imperialism waged by the peoples that are building socialism and communism, the revolutionary movement of the working class in the capitalist countries, the national liberation struggle of the oppressed peoples, the democratic movement in general; in the alliance of the anti-imperialist revolutionary forces, the decisive role belongs to the international working class and to its main offspring—the world system of socialism which exerts the principle influence . . . by the force of its example. . . .*

Precisely how this "force of example" is supposed to work to transform the imperialist world is nowhere spelled out, but it seems logical to conclude from what is said about the possibility of peaceful revolutions in capitalist countries and about the "non-capitalist" road for underdeveloped countries, that the Russians believe that the success of the socialist countries will eventually be such as to stimulate an overwhelming urge to emulation in the working people of the capitalist countries. The bourgeoisies of these countries will presumably lack the power to resist, or at most their resistance will be weak and relatively easily overcome. As for the underdeveloped countries, they will first enter the non-capitalist road of development, and this road will lead, thanks to generous assistance from the socialist countries, to a socialist destination.

The two rival conceptions of the great historical transition of our epoch thus boil down to the following: The Chinese see imperialism wracked by its own profound internal contradictions, tearing itself apart, and ultimately destroying itself in a series of anti-imperialist wars and revolutions which will bring socialism to the oppressed countries and presumably eventually set the stage for successful proletarian revolutions in the oppressor countries. The Russians, on the other hand, see a gradual transformation of imperialism under the benign impact of the increasingly successful example of the socialist countries.

As between these two views, it seems clear to us that the Chinese is based on an accurate evaluation not only of their

* The omissions here are obvious typographical errors in the *New York Times* version, which is the only one available to us at the time of writing. The sense of the passage, however, is quite clear.

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own long and rich experience with imperialism but also of the entire panoply of international realities stretching from Cuba on one side of the world to South Vietnam on the other. The Russian view, it seems equally clear, cannot be supported by any concrete facts or trends and must be interpreted as a species of large-scale wishful thinking. If this is so—and the Chinese are obviously as convinced of it as we are—there can be no doubt that history will prove the Chinese right and that their views are bound sooner or later to be accepted by the revolutionaries of the oppressed countries—as, indeed, they already are by many of them. Whether or not the Soviet leaders will also come in time to see matters this way is a question we cannot now answer; but we have no hesitation in saying that unless they do, they will certainly forfeit whatever claim they may have to leadership of the world revolutionary movement.

This analysis indicates that time is on the side of the Chinese, that their best strategy is to tell the truth as they see it, waiting patiently for history to prove them right and in the meantime doing everything possible to build socialism in China and to develop their own nuclear deterrent.

But this is not what the Chinese are doing. Apart from such surface questions as who attacked whom at whose party congress, there is no denying that it has been the Chinese, not the Russians, who have been on the offensive throughout the current dispute. Soviet international policy has on the whole been remarkably consistent throughout the whole postwar period, and its theoretical underpinnings, far from being a creation of Khrushchev, are a logical development of the "socialism in one country" doctrine which Stalin espoused in the mid-twenties and the popular front doctrine of ten years later. For some thirty years, the Chinese, though their actions were by no means always consistent with these doctrines, not only carefully refrained from criticizing the Soviet leadership but even went so far as to emphasize on many occasions their solidarity with the Soviet Union and their confidence in its leaders.

The first signs of a change in Chinese policy in this re-

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spect can be traced back to the mid-fifties, but it was only in 1959-1960, especially after the first clashes on the Sino-Indian border and the nearly simultaneous visit of Khrushchev to the United States, that Chinese attacks on Soviet policies and leaders began to come out into the open. From then on, the pattern of attack-counterattack has steadily intensified until by now the charges flying back and forth between the Chinese and Soviet capitals can be described only in terms of extreme bitterness and unconcealed hostility.

Why did the Chinese choose to precipitate and then exacerbate this dispute with the Soviet Union? What do they hope to accomplish?

We do not *know* the answers, of course. But if we take account of the form of the Chinese polemics and keep in mind the history of the international socialist movement, we can make what perhaps deserves to be called an "educated guess."

The Chinese attack has been directed not only at specific policies and ideas but even more sharply at what are thought to be "modern revisionism" and "modern revisionists," so called after earlier deviationist tendencies and leaders in the international socialist movement, particularly those associated with the names of Edward Bernstein in the 1890's and Karl Kautsky at the time of the First World War and the Russian Revolution. The Chinese position in this respect is stated in the following terms near the end of the June 14th letter:

> In order to carry out the common program of the international Communist movement unanimously agreed upon by the fraternal parties, an uncompromising struggle must be waged against all forms of opportunism, which is a deviation from Marxism-Leninism.
>
> The declaration [of 1957] and the statement [of 1960] point out that revisionism, or in other words, Right opportunism, is the main danger in the international Communist movement. Yugoslav revisionism typifies modern revisionism. . . .
>
> Over the last few years, the revisionist trend flooding the international working class movement and the many experiences and lessons of the international Communist movement have fully confirmed the correctness of the conclusion in the declaration and the statement that revisionism is the main danger. . . .

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Firm Marxist-Leninists and genuine Marxist-Leninist parties must put principles first. They must not barter away principles, approving one thing today and another tomorrow, advocating one thing today and another tomorrow.

Together with all Marxist-Leninists, the Chinese Communists will continue to wage an uncompromising struggle against modern revisionism in order to defend the purity of Marxism-Leninism and the principled stand of the declaration and the statement. . . .

As stated in the 1957 declaration, proletarian parties "should firmly adhere to the principle of combining . . . universal Marxist-Leninist truth with the specific practice of revolution and construction in their countries." . . .

Some people are now violating this basic principle, which was long ago affirmed in the declaration. On the pretext of "creatively developing Marxism-Leninism," they cast aside the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism. Moreover, they describe as "universal Marxist-Leninist truths" their own prescriptions which are based on nothing but subjective conjecture and are divorced from reality and from the masses, and they force others to accept these prescriptions unconditionally.

That is why many grave phenomena have come to pass in the international Communist movement.

If "some people"—obviously meaning modern revisionists, typified by Tito but by clear implication including Khrushchev and all who follow the Soviet line—are the source of all the trouble, the remedy is obvious: remove them from positions of responsibility and power. The underlying objective of the Chinese is thus seen to be a change in the leadership of the Soviet Union and of the countries and parties which support the Soviet position. Khrushchev must go!

But why have the Chinese chosen to press this campaign *now*? The result was bound to be a quarrel, possibly even a showdown followed by a disastrous split in the international movement. What do they need it for?

Two hypotheses suggest themselves. One is that the Chinese believe we are about to enter—or have already entered—a period of intense revolutionary activity, especially in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and that a change in Communist leadership is therefore of the greatest and most immediate

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urgency. The second, and by no means mutually exclusive, hypothesis is that the Chinese believe a strong opposition exists inside the Soviet and other Communist Parties which is ready and capable of taking over leadership when the impending crises have revealed the bankruptcy of the revisionist line.

If these are indeed the Chinese calculations, they seem to us to reflect in part a seriously foreshortened view of the probable course of events in the period ahead, and in part a basic misunderstanding of the situation in the Soviet Union and the other more advanced socialist countries.

It is certainly true that the oppressed continents of Asia, Africa, and Latin America are in a time of troubles the only escape from which lies through profound, *socialist* revolutions. But it does not follow that this escape is imminent. We have tried to explain in these pages why successful revolutions are not likely in the near future in Latin America;* and from what limited knowledge we possess, we would judge that they are even less imminent in most of Africa and in such a key Asian country as India. What seems more likely in these areas is a relatively long period of economic and social degeneration, developing internal strife, abortive uprisings, imperialist interventions, military coups and dictatorships. Out of all this will eventually develop powerful revolutionary movements, steeled in battle and capable of conducting the struggle against imperialism to ultimate victory. Already we can discern the shape of the future—particularly, though from different angles, in Cuba and Vietnam. But it does not follow that "the future is already here."

When it comes to the internal situation in the Soviet Union and the other more advanced socialist countries, we know of no evidence suggesting the existence of a significant left-wing opposition. On the other hand, what we have heard from people with first-hand knowledge whose judgment we trust leads us to believe that the present line of the leadership, stressing peace, disarmament, peaceful competition of systems, and so on, is very much in accord with the popular mood. The peoples of these countries are intensely wrapped up in their own

* See "Notes on Latin America," *MR,* March 1963.

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problems. After years of war, social upheaval, deprivation, repression, they see life becoming a little easier; and they rightly believe that even bigger improvements are possible in the near future. What they want more than anything else is a long period of peace and calm, and they apparently believe that their leaders are doing their best to secure it. It is no accident that Soviet anti-Chinese propaganda hammers away unceasingly on the theme that the Chinese want war.

Under these circumstances, Chinese attacks on the Soviet leadership not only do not encourage the formation of an effective opposition but actually serve to rally the people more closely around their leaders. One may deplore all this, as the Chinese undoubtedly do; one may think that a different official line and a different popular mood are desirable (or essential) for the further development of socialism and the defeat of imperialism. But deploring something does not mean that one is justified in ignoring it.

We would not go so far as to argue that Chinese pressure on the Soviet leadership can accomplish nothing positive. A certain amount of rivalry between the two biggest socialist countries for leadership of the world movement is probably a good thing. It puts both of them on notice that their words and actions are being carefully weighed and watched; it stimulates them to try to improve their performances at home and abroad. Albania would almost certainly have been bullied into submission (or forced into the arms of the West) if the Chinese had not stood ready to provide assistance; and one may be permitted to wonder if the generous treatment accorded Cuba by the Soviet Union would have been quite so generous if there had been no Sino-Soviet dispute.*

* To analyze specific Chinese charges and Soviet counter-charges would take us far beyond the limits of the present essay, but we cannot pass over the subject of Cuba without noting that here at least the Soviet Union seems to have by far the better of the argument. The United States *was* deterred from an attack on Cuba last autumn. In the light of this fact, Chinese charges of adventurism and capitulationism can only be considered unfounded and irresponsible.

Unfortunately, this is not the only affair in which the Chinese have acted in a manner calculated to hurt their own cause. Reliable and by no means anti-Chinese observers at the Women's Federation Congress in

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But after all possible allowances have been made, it must be said that the positive aspects of the dispute are strictly limited indeed. We do not see how the Chinese can expect to achieve anything, for themselves or anyone else, by pushing matters closer and closer to a showdown with the Soviet leadership in the present world situation. No dramatic changes appear to be in the offing in Asia, Africa, and Latin America; and there is no alternative leadership to be nurtured and encouraged in the more developed socialist countries. On the other hand, if the Chinese go too far and too fast, the danger of a disruption of the Sino-Soviet alliance will certainly grow, and the American ruling class will be increasingly tempted to try to solve its insoluble problems by resort to unrestrained thermonuclear violence.

On the basic issue in their dispute with the Soviet leaders the Chinese are right. History will prove them so. But attempts to force the pace of history may bring on disasters worse than the ones they are intended to avert.

(September 10, 1963)

Moscow early in the summer report that the behavior of the Chinese delegation was stupidly provocative, and there are indications that at some international meetings the Chinese have not scrupled to use racial arguments of a kind that obviously have no place in the socialist movement. On the other hand, it must be said that the shameless way the Russians distort Chinese views on war, disarmament, and peaceful coexistence is no less reprehensible.

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ALUMINUM PROFITS AND CARIBBEAN PEOPLE

BY PHILIP RENO

When Arthur Vining Davis, long-time head of the Aluminum Company of America (Alcoa), died last year, he left behind $400 million. Of this, $1 million went to his secretary, about $100 million to the United States in taxes, and $300 million to two Arthur Vining Davis foundations. Income of the foundations—more than $13 million a year if the principal were simply banked—is to be used "for such charitable, scientific, literary, and educational purposes within the United States and its possessions as the trustees shall see fit." A princely legacy, bequeathed to uses of broadest latitude.

The bequest does, however, stipulate one restraint of substance: its use is limited to the United States and its possessions. Lands from which much of this fortune was derived, lands in urgent need of help, were not remembered in the will. Nor could these lands recover through inheritance taxes (as the United States could and did) any part of the huge block of wealth that their people and their resources had helped provide. This limitation on spending the foundations' income might be hopelessly shrugged off—"To him who hath, etc."—if it were not related to the struggle by the countries that produce aluminum ore for a share in the wealth extracted from their lands.

Bauxite, the ore from which aluminum is refined, is found in high grade and in quantity in a dozen emerging and half a dozen industrialized countries. Major among these primary producers are various Caribbean islands and lands bordering them to the south. The North American aluminum industry obtains over 90 percent of its ore from this area, and out of this ore produces half the capitalist world's aluminum. Jamaica, Surinam, and British Guiana are the major bauxite sources,

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Philip Reno recently spent several months in British Guiana studying the Guianese economy, with special reference to the role of foreign investment.

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Jamaica alone supplying one fifth of the bauxite of the world. The Dominican Republic and Haiti mine fair quantities, and extensive exploration is going on in Costa Rica, Panama, Puerto Rico, and French Guiana.

Historically, one crop—sugar—dominated the Caribbean economy, raised on great estates first by slaves, then by indentured labor, and now by "free labor"—free in the classic, Marxist sense. Sugar, British-owned, is still the Caribbean king, but American-owned aluminum has moved quietly in beside the throne. And around the rich sugar and aluminum holdings, the slogan of the slaves of the 1830's—"Massa day done"—again agitates the Caribbean air. This time the people, more sophisticated, are adding a question, or implied purpose, about the new day that will replace the old, "Massa's," day. "Massa day done," they say, "but it for who?" Foreign exploitation of mineral resources is an important aspect of this ultimate question.

Aluminum's Big Four

Aluminum operations in the Caribbean area have grown steadily since 1922, when Alcoa began to ship bauxite from Surinam and British Guiana. Alcoa, then worth under a hundred million dollars, grew to a capitalization of one and a quarter billion by 1961, and in the meantime had set up a Canadian subsidiary, Aluminium, Ltd. (Altd), to take over most of Alcoa's foreign operations. Altd was itself capitalized in 1961 at over a billion dollars. As the most accessible Arkansas bauxite was depleted, the bauxite of Surinam and British Guiana, high grade and moderately low cost, became basic to the industry's prodigious growth.

By the mid-1920's, the aluminum industry had taken on monopoly form—probably the most perfect monopoly in America. By the end of that decade, Alcoa and Altd had organized an international aluminum cartel—a prototype of international cartels. In accord with monopoly economics, prices were maintained by restricting output.

The Second World War at last set off a vast expansion of aluminum production—in France, Germany, and most of all, in North America. In 1939, Alcoa and Altd were the only

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American producers of aluminum ingot. Reynolds took advantage of war demands to force its way into the production field, and after the war Kaiser also entered. Within ten years, Reynolds and Kaiser had grown to giant size, in large part through opening rich Jamaican mines.

In spite of the newcomers' successes, Alcoa and Altd still dominate world aluminum. Their combined capacity includes 54 percent of North American capacity, and they also have refineries in Brazil, Italy, United Kingdom, Norway, Sweden, Japan, and India, as well as fabricating plants in other countries. Their 1961 production totaled over 40 percent of capitalist world output, and exceeded that of the socialist world. A 1951 court decree divorcing the stock ownership of Alcoa from that of Altd did not disturb their working relationship.

The following few statistics may help assay the resources of the four great aluminum companies (the figures are from 1961 company reports, and are in millions of U.S. dollars):

	Alcoa	*Altd*	*Reynolds*	*Kaiser*
Total invested capital	1,160	1,088	814	654
Sales and operating revenue	853	521	478	424
Return on capital (profits after taxes plus interest paid)	135	109	80	86

Other North American producers in 1961 were Ormet Corporation, Harvey Aluminum, and Anaconda Aluminum. The total capacity of these three companies was 325,000 tons, compared to 446,000 for Reynolds, lowest-tonnage producer of the big four in 1961.

The Caribbean Primary Producing Countries

What of the Caribbean countries that produce the ore for half the capitalist world's aluminum? Not one has a gross national product of all goods and services as large as Alcoa's sales and operating revenues. The total expenditure of all combined for health, education, and welfare is far less than the big four's net profits. Their per capita income is barely one tenth that of the United States.

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Out of every four of their urban workers, at least one is unemployed. In their countrysides, underemployment is universal and chronic. On the islands, refugees from eroded highlands have flooded the already overcrowded cities. General population growth will double their working force in fewer than 20 years, so that a large part of any increase in their national incomes must go just to hold their own.

The most cursory review brings out that the countries are in fact not holding their own, at least in terms of the living standards of their people. In Haiti, a corrupt government has let the economy degenerate into chaos. In British Guiana, an honest and enlightened government is beleaguered by American and British imperialisms, and its valiant efforts cannot stretch meager resources enough to cover broad social needs. In Jamaica, Surinam, and the Dominican Republic, national income has been expanding significantly, but the increase seems to go simply to growing numbers and rising living standards of the middle and upper classes. These countries' many poor are actually as well as relatively growing poorer, while the few rich grow richer.

The essential thing, as in all developing countries, is capital investment and social planning. Government resources for investment are limited, although an adequate tax structure could raise them substantially. The upper class is not inclined to invest its money locally, but sends it to the United States or England or Canada, and joins it in flight as soon as possible. Sugar and aluminum have invested very little in relation either to what they could invest or to what is needed. American aid has by-passed the European colonies; while England, with four hundred years of plunder and profit safely stowed away, pleads poverty herself and offers little development capital.

Within the Caribbean countries, the people who mine and process bauxite are relatively well off. The aluminum companies pay wages which are about twice the going Caribbean rates (that is, they pay about one third of North American rates) and provide hospitals, trade schools, and housing. There are also other islands of well-being rising from the general sea of poverty and discontent—the islands of middle-class life.

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An important section of the Caribbean middle class, the decisive section in certain countries, is made up of government employees. In Jamaica and British Guiana this section was recruited and trained by the British, and in Surinam by the Dutch. Advancement and other advantages went to individuals whose attitudes and loyalties promised the defense of colonial economic empires after the political empires were dissolved. The middle-class political organizations, as well as the individuals who made up the middle class, responded predictably. And increasingly, the income of the government employee section of the middle class depends on government revenues that the aluminum companies supply.

Government revenues have more than doubled over the past ten years. Taxes on bauxite have made an increase of this magnitude possible. Nevertheless, what the aluminum companies can and should pay in taxes beyond what they now pay is the first issue the countries face in dealing with the companies. How the additional revenue may be used for the countries' welfare is a correlative issue.

Aluminum Profits and How They Are Taxed

Taxes on bauxite have been set in bargaining between each country and the aluminum companies. In the course of this bargaining, the countries have established tonnage export duties and royalties on bauxite. These yield a regular, if minor, contribution to government revenue. Each Caribbean country also has an income tax, and each began by trying to fit the aluminum companies into the general income tax structure. This proved all but impossible.

That the aluminum companies do make high profits from their Caribbean operations cannot be doubted. Total return on capital for the big four was over $400 million in 1961, and to this affluence the Caribbean countries must have contributed substantially. There are, however, but few reports to indicate just how large this Caribbean contribution may have been.

The U.S. Commerce Department's *Survey of Current Business* does report 1961 profits amounting to $64 million for U.S. mining companies' operations in Western Hemisphere dependencies of European countries. Over 90 percent of these profits

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would certainly have come from aluminum operations in Jamaica (independent by 1962), Surinam, and British Guiana. If Altd earnings are added, total aluminum company profits would have been $70 to $75 million on an investment of between $220 and $270 million (the companies can write off investment rapidly through heavy depreciation allowances). Profits as a percent of investment would thus amount to somewhere between 26 and 34 percent, and as a percent of value of product (about $200 million) to at least 35 percent. These figures suggest that this could well be among the most profitable U.S. investment structures in the world.

It should be possible to check these profit figures by estimating individual company earnings in the various producing countries. Such estimates, however, run into difficulties, study of which brings out that actual profits are even higher than any reported figures. The less significant of these difficulties concerns company bookkeeping.

Commerce Department reports, for example, give certain breakdowns of U.S. company operations in Jamaica, Surinam, and British Guiana. These show current costs of aluminum company operations in 1957 as amounting to $81 million, divided as follows: materials and services—$31 million; wages and salaries—$19 million; depreciation and depletion—$13 million; taxes—$14; and other—$4 million. How materials and services could account for almost 40 percent of the costs, and so much more than wages and salaries, is hard to see in this kind of operation. The suspicion of padding naturally arises, and of payments to U.S. shipping, insurance, and other interests that permit a transfer of payments to hide profits.

A more serious difficulty arises from the fact that these great aluminum operations extend vertically from mining in various countries, through intermediate processing and transshipping in other countries, to smelting in the mother country, and on to fabrication often in yet other countries. The companies operate in the primary producing countries either directly or through wholly owned subsidiaries. Practically all metal grade bauxite produced by a subsidiary is taken by the parent company, and at a price set by the parent.

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The price thus set on bauxite need not permit a profit by the subsidiary since the only matter of consequence to the industry owners is that the overall operation make money. The lower the bauxite price, the less the taxes paid to the primary producing country, and the more the profit after taxes left over for the companies. As a result, bauxite prices have been kept down with a rigidity singular even within the controlled price mechanisms of American monopoly.

From 1938 to 1959, the general U.S. price level rose by 138 percent. During these years, the price of the bauxite produced in the United States doubled. Yet the price of bauxite imported from Surinam and British Guiana was almost the same in 1959 as it had been in 1938. That the companies were holding the price of imported bauxite at a dead level did not prevent them from raising the price of aluminum, which went up by 78 percent between 1948 and 1959.

The prices set on bauxite from all the Caribbean countries except British Guiana did finally begin to rise a few years ago. The explanation lies with the law granting tax concessions to U.S. companies operating in other countries of this hemisphere through what are called Western Hemisphere Trade Corporations. Instead of a 52 percent corporate income tax, Western Hemisphere Trade Corporations pay the U.S. only 25 percent. By raising the price of bauxite, U.S. companies could now reduce their total income taxes. The price of bauxite began to rise for the first time in 20 years, except for British Guiana bauxite mined by Altd, Canada based and unaffected by Western Hemisphere Trade Corporation maneuvers.

Prices of bauxite imported into the United States in 1960, as reported by the Bureau of Mines, varied from $6.85 for British Guiana bauxite to $12.50 for Dominican Republic bauxite. Yet British Guiana bauxite is higher grade, and hence worth more, than Dominican Republic bauxite. If the value of British Guiana bauxite in 1961 had been equal to that of Surinam bauxite (of approximately the same high grade), British Guiana would have gained more than $1.5 million in income taxes from Altd's British Guiana subsidiary.

Because of the difficulty of determining profits, the alumi-

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num-producing countries, with the exception of British Guiana, have turned increasingly toward a fixed tax per ton of bauxite produced. The trouble with this method is that the countries do not benefit from the companies' high-profit years. Reynolds, for example, reported U.S. taxes (the sum of current and deferred taxes for purposes of this comparison) of just under $5 million in 1961, and state and foreign taxes, no doubt largely to Jamaica, of $3.4 million. In 1958, Reynolds' U.S. taxes had been almost $28 million, state and foreign taxes $4.4 million. Reynolds' high-profit years mean little to Jamaica.

Aluminum's Wave of the Future

The aluminum companies have, in the standard imperialist pattern, kept the Caribbean countries simply as sources of raw material, and have refined and fabricated aluminum in Canada, the United States, and England. Now at last, economic compulsions reinforced by political pressures are impelling the companies toward processing and refining operations in the primary producing countries.

The economic compulsions derive primarily from the opening of markets for aluminum products in the developing countries. Aluminum's resistance to corrosion suits it for use in tropical climates. The ease with which it can be formed and fabricated makes it attractive to economies without extra capital. Its high electrical conductivity and light weight give it a market in countries embarking on electrification programs. Yet even in the most advanced of the industrializing countries, such as Argentina, per capita aluminum consumption is less than one tenth of that in the United States. Both Kaiser and Reynolds have projected smelters in Argentina, each with a capacity of 20,000 tons annually.

Aluminum smelting is important to underdeveloped countries not only because of the consequent gains in national income and industrial skills, but also because of the high electricity consumption in the smelting process—nearly 7 kwh per pound of aluminum. Electric power can be the key to any country's industrialization. An example of how electrification for aluminum smelting can aid an emerging country is Ghana's Volta

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River Project, undertaken by Kaiser, with a 10 percent Reynolds interest, in cooperation with the Ghana government. Aluminum capacity of 100,000 tons is scheduled by 1965. Aluminum reduction will be provided by a hydro-electric development partly private, partly government financed. Half of the power will go to the Ghana government, and will make possible a qualitative change in the Ghanaian economy.

The Brokopondo Project being undertaken by Alcoa in Surinam is a far more conservative enterprise than the Volta River project, and far less favorable to the development of the area. The Surinam government is to get 10 percent of the power generated by the project. A 60,000-ton aluminum capacity is expected in 1965, making this the largest producer in South America.

Ghana and Surinam are two instances of the remarkable expansion going on in the aluminum industry. Largest developments are in Australia, where Alcoa, Kaiser, and Pechiney of France, major concern outside of North America, are each engaged in large scale expansion. Alcoa has also joined Mexican interests to build Mexico's first aluminum smelter, and Reynolds has contracted with Venezuela to build a $30-million smelter. In Africa, Ormet and Pechiney have combined in the $150-million Fria development in Guinea. In India and Indonesia refineries are going up, the Indonesian complex being built by the Indonesian government with technical and financial aid from the USSR. These and other projects will double the aluminum capacity outside of North America within the next few years.

Whether world aluminum consumption will grow fast enough to take up the new production is very doubtful—one of the doubts that cloud the future in unplanned capitalist society. When retrenchment sets in to allow consumption to catch up, small nations, like small businesses, will be left at the mercy of the great combines. Another dubious factor for the aluminum future is the U.S. "strategic" stockpile, swollen now to more than a two-year supply of bauxite needed for all U.S. production, and including excessive quantities of alumina and aluminum as well.

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In fact, nowhere more than in aluminum is the whole frenetic, cold-war, capitalist world more startling, and nowhere are the evil consequences of its planlessness as unnecessary. For the aluminum industry in the developing countries is the last word in industry which is social in form while private in ownership. The Demba (Altd subsidiary) operations in British Guiana are more or less typical. Competent managers and technicians directing skilled workers (an increasing number of whom are Guianese) smoothly run a complex process to make profit for far-away and largely unknown owners. These profits, which go and stay in foreign lands, are derived from the diminishing natural resources of a people whose present is one of urgent need, and whose future is at the mercy of planless, conflicting economic forces.

A few conclusions seem obvious. One is that the aluminum industry can easily afford a more substantial contribution to Caribbean development. Practically, this means higher taxes on bauxite operations, and insistence on more processing, refining, and fabricating in the Caribbean countries.

Another conclusion is that as long as the great companies can play one primary producing country off against another by granting or withholding investments, the countries cannot cope with the companies. Furthermore, even with sound planning within the primary producing countries, the sporadic development of the capitalist world can catch these small countries in an economic cul-de-sac from which they will not be able to escape. The consequences to Jamaica, for example, of a not unlikely cutback in aluminum production in 1966 could be desperate. A common front of the primary producing countries, perhaps with UN technical aid, could set standards of taxation, industrialization, etc., and could even take steps to soften the economic blows resulting from capitalist planlessness.

Finally, without effective economic planning, much of any increased income from taxes, or from loans or any other sources, will not go into capital development, but into goods and services for the middle class, and into deposits by the upper class in foreign banks.

It is widely accepted in the Caribbean that for economic

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planning to mean anything for the masses of the people, it must be planning for socialism. Manley in Jamaica, Bosch in the Dominican Republic, and others who lead or have led or hope to lead governments, promise socialism. But it is abundantly clear in the Caribbean and throughout the emerging world that middle-class and business-dominated governments, just as feudal and gangster governments, will not plan for anything except individual and class advantage. This is the kind of planning that the United States and Britain understand and approve of. There are, however, an increasing number of Caribbean people who are determined to have socialism whether we approve or not. The hope for the Caribbean is in their hands.

A NOTE ON WORLD ECONOMIC INEQUALITY

BY HENRY HAASE

The somewhat fanciful table on the next page is of some interest. It shows concisely what cannot really be put precisely but nevertheless what in general has been taking place over the last 150 years.

About the year 1800 the income of the developed area of the world (at that time, Western Europe) accounted for about 46 percent of total world income. The rest of the world had somewhat more than half of the total world income. About the year 1900 the developed area of the world, now expanded to include Western Europe, the United States and Canada, Australia and New Zealand, whose combined share of the

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total world population probably did not exceed that of Western Europe in 1800, had nevertheless obtained more than half of the total world income, leaving some 42 percent to the remaining 80 percent of the world's population. About 1962, the developed area of the world, now including Eastern and Western Europe, the United States and Canada, Australia and New Zealand, South Africa and Japan, with about 30 percent of world population had over 80 percent of world income, leaving to the rest of the world less than 20 percent.

WORLD POPULATION AND INCOME[1]

	Population (millions)	*Income per capita* ($)	*Total Income* (billion $)
	Circa 1800		
Developed countries	190	200	38
Percent of total	21		46
Underdeveloped countries	730	60	44
Percent of total	79		54
Total	920		82
	Circa 1900		
Developed countries	300	400	120
Percent of total	20		58
Underdeveloped countries	1,230	70	86
Percent of total	80		42
Total	1,530		206
	Circa 1962		
Developed countries	950	970	921
Percent of total	31		82
Underdeveloped countries	2,100	95	200
Percent of total	69		18
Total	3,050		1,121

1. The *World Food Budget, 1962* and *1966*, Foreign Agriculture Report, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Table 1, p. 9; and Anthony Barnett, *The Human Species*, rev. ed., 1961, Penguin Books, table p. 309.

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Even after adjusting for the fact that the developed area of the world now has a larger portion of the world's population than in 1800 or in 1900, it would still remain true that over the last 150 years, no matter the exact ratios, the share of total world income going to the underdeveloped area of the world has shrunk and is still shrinking drastically.

The American taxpayer has loaned or given away $84.1 billion since the end of World War II. It was distributed as follows:

Developed countries	$49.7
Underdeveloped countries	34.4
Total	$84.1

The U.S. has been transferring about $2 billion a year to the underdeveloped countries. If the other developed countries had matched the U.S., this would have meant a transfer of less than 0.5 percent of the income of the developed countries and an addition of 2 percent to that of the underdeveloped countries. Perhaps all that this transfer of income has done during this period is to allow the population of the underdeveloped countries to increase without the check of famine. This can be viewed as either a small or a great accomplishment.

It stands to reason then that in a world where less than 1/3 of the population has over 80 percent of the income and is steadily increasing that share while making only token transfers to prevent famine and the spread of disease (which might affect directly its own population)—it stands to reason that in such a world, expenditures on armaments by the developed countries must continue to mount and that savage unrest throughout the world is bound to increase. The two camps into which the developed world is divided try, each in its own way, to make use of this unrest against the other.

While the economies of the developed countries continue to grow, even greater will be the growth in armaments and, as a concomitant, the growth in consumption of the most frivolous luxuries in these countries.

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IF LABOR WINS

BY RALPH MILIBAND

There are countries where the decline and eventual defeat of a government open up complex questions as to the identity of its successor. Britain is not one such country: the decline of the present Conservative Government, which has recently assumed spectacular proportions, and its defeat at the next General Election, which seems increasingly probable, can only have one beneficiary, namely the Labor Party. Talk of a Liberal revival remains just talk, while the Communist Party does not require mention when it comes to electoral calculations. Of course, nothing in this context is finally certain until it has happened, and it would be foolish to underestimate the Conservatives' capacity to fight back with vigor and effect. Even so, it is very doubtful whether the Conservatives can now regain enough impetus to carry them to victory, within the year or so in which they must hold a General Election. If the election were held now, they would be massacred; this autumn or next spring, the chances are that they will be soundly beaten and that the Labor Party, after more than twelve years in opposition, will again find itself in office, with a substantial parliamentary majority. This is by no means to suggest that there has occurred, or that there is likely to occur between now and the General Election, a mass conversion to Labor, let alone to socialism. The signs in fact are that Labor has gained little new positive support: it is rather that the Conservatives have lost a lot of ground in the last year or so—quite enough, on present form, to make the difference between victory and defeat.

On the assumption, then, that Labor will be returned to office, I propose to examine what a Labor Government is likely to do with its victory, which is the same as asking what the Labor Party is now about and what it wants. Labor policies

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have now been worked out and it is very improbable that there will be any significant departure from, or addition to, its policies between now and the election. This, combined with an analysis of the recent past and the immediate present, at least reduces, if it does not altogether eliminate, the element of conjecture about Labor's intentions and attitudes.

Party leaders, in the English political system, are extremely powerful figures, and the replacement of one leader by another must inevitably cause shifts and changes of serious political consequence. The point has been made with particular emphasis in relation to Harold Wilson's assumption of the Labor Party's leadership because he has been generally thought to be a good deal to the left of Gaitskell. After all, he did resign with Aneurin Bevan from the Labor Government in 1951; he did oppose German rearmament in 1953-1954; and he did stand against Gaitskell for the leadership of the Labor Party in December 1960, at the height of the unilateralist controversy, and with the support of the Labor left.

Before looking a little more closely at Mr. Wilson's politics and commitments, it may be worth making the point that, even if he were as radical as some people on the Labor left have suggested, account would still have to be taken of the men around him. Mr. Wilson inherited from Hugh Gaitskell a set of colleagues, in the "Shadow Cabinet," and in the National Executive of the Labor Party, of whose political orientations there need not be the slightest doubt: they are firmly situated on the right, in some cases the extreme right, of the Labor spectrum. This is true of Mr. George Brown, the deputy leader of the Labor Party, and of Mr. Patrick Gordon-Walker, at present "Shadow" Foreign Secretary; it is scarcely less true of Mr. James Callaghan, at present "Shadow" Chancellor of the Exchequer; and most of Mr. Wilson's other close colleagues also range all the way from right to extreme right. Had Mr. Wilson owed his elevation to a powerful leftward current in the Parliamentary Party, which elects the leader, and in the Labor movement generally, he might have been able to dispense with the services of at least some of these men. As it is, Mr. Wilson is not in a position to dispense with them and he

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must, to a certain extent, try to conciliate colleagues who were, until a very short while ago, bitterly opposed to him. Also, there are very few Labor politicians on the left whose claims Mr. Wilson cannot afford to ignore, or who could be brought in to strengthen his hypothetical left-wing tendencies. The only men at the upper reaches of Labor's hierarchy who are not of the right are ageing members of the old Bevanite group: the most prominent among them, Mr. R.H.S. Crossman, is a man of fertile mind and intellectual brilliance, but his radicalism, though real, is of too erratic and unreliable a kind to make him a serious spokesman for the left. Mrs. Barbara Castle and Mr. Anthony Greenwood, both members of the National Executive, are much less erratic, but they are also less influential; while Mr. Michael Foot, upon whom the mantle of Aneurin Bevan might have fallen, is a most effective left-wing speaker, journalist and pamphleteer, but has so far not revealed the requisite qualities of leadership, not to mention the fact that his views are anathema to a large majority of his present parliamentary colleagues. There is a not negligible number of left M.P.'s in the Parliamentary Labor Party, and there will be more after the next election. But the left M.P.'s are not now a group capable of acting as an influential element of pressure.

Given this disposition of forces, it would be easy to conjure up a vision of a radical party leader, held back by orthodox colleagues, frustrated in his radical leanings by the team he inherited from his predecessor, impatient but temporarily unable to shift the Labor Party to the left. Such a picture would, I believe, be very seriously misleading. No doubt, there are differences between Mr. Wilson and his immediate colleagues; and Mr. Wilson is in a variety of ways different from his predecessor. But it would be naive in the extreme to think of these differences as being simply a matter of Mr. Wilson being "left," while Mr. Gaitskell was "right," or of a socialist Mr. Wilson being surrounded by orthodox colleagues. These are not the categories within which these things may be seriously discussed. The real differences, such as they are, lie elsewhere.

They lie, first of all, in the fact that Mr. Wilson, unlike Hugh Gaitskell, has no wish to remove the ambiguities and

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confusions which lie at the core of Labor's being, for instance in regard to nationalization. On the contrary, Mr. Wilson's whole career since 1951 has been built on ambiguity and a careful avoidance of too specific a commitment in the various disputes that have agitated the Labor movement since that time. This is what people mean when they say, by no means as a compliment, that Mr. Wilson is a clever politician, which is undoubtedly true. Thus Mr. Wilson did resign from the Labor Government at the same time as Bevan, but kept his distance from the Bevanite rebels; he did oppose German rearmament but quickly fell into line when the left was defeated on this issue; when Mr. Bevan resigned from the Shadow Cabinet in 1954 because he was being hounded by his opponents, it was Mr. Wilson who smoothly stepped into the vacant seat; it was Mr. Wilson who enthusiastically commended to the Labor Party Conference of 1957 a document on nationalization, *Industry and Society,* which was the first major attempt under Mr. Gaitskell's regime to wean the Labor Party away from its commitments on the subject. Mr. Wilson was not unwilling to let it be said that he did not approve of Mr. Gaitskell's handling of the Clause 4 issue, but only on the ground that there was no need to raise the issue at all; and while Mr. Wilson did stand for leadership of the Labor Party against Mr. Gaitskell, he also made it very clear that he must not in any way be thought to have unilateralist sympathies. Mr. Wilson, in other words, has brought the cultivation of middle ground to a fine pitch of perfection.

A position somewhat left of center, Clement Attlee once said, was the only possible and proper position for a leader of the Labor Party, and Mr. Wilson has heartily endorsed this pronouncement. But the notion that Attlee *was* a left of center leader is one of the carefully fostered myths of Labor politics: the record shows that on most of the issues which really mattered, Attlee was unequivocally opposed to left policies. Nor indeed is this really surprising: choices have to be made and sets of policies must revolve around one axis or another. Leaders cannot perpetually be all things to all men.

Of course, the framework within which the choices are

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made vary from place to place. In the British context, and in relation to home policy at least, the touchstone of a Labor leader's commitment is above all the issue of nationalization. This is certainly not the only issue on which political biases and attitudes may be established; but it is a critical one, to my mind the most critical of all as far as home policy is concerned. As it happens, it is also an issue on which a great deal of precise information, both as to Mr. Wilson's own position and that of the Labor leaders generally, is available.

Four days after his election as leader of the Labor Party in February of this year, Mr. Wilson was challenged in the House of Commons by a Conservative M.P. to say whether he stood by Clause 4. Mr. Wilson did not burke the issue. He said that he did, and added that so did the whole Labor Party. Formally, this is quite true. The Labor Party does stand by Clause 4, as it has stood by it since 1918. In practice, however, the gulf which separates Mr. Wilson from his right wing colleagues on this issue does not seem very wide. To repeat a point made earlier: "revisionism" of the Gaitskell variety did *not* exclude the possibility of occasional nationalization. A group of Labor M.P.'s expressed the point to perfection in a letter to *The Times* last March. "The public is now tired," they wrote, "of Conservative politicians who seek, by irrational and emotional propaganda, to make a political scarecrow of public ownership"; its extension, they added, "is a purely practical question of what is the most efficient and economic manner to organize particular industrial processes in the national interest." (*The Times,* March 13, 1963.) Furthermore, Labor spokesmen, from Mr. Wilson downwards, have said again and again that save for the re-nationalization of steel and parts of road transport, the Labor Party had no plans for any take-over of industries or firms. The only qualification which needs to be introduced to this lies in some formulations of the program adopted by the Annual Conference of the Labor Party in 1961, called *Signposts for the Sixties.* This document suggests that where "competition creates not efficiency but chaos in a key sector of the economy," "an expansion of public ownership may be necessary to put things right." Similarly, "where major

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changes of ownership and control in a vital industry are threatened by take-over bid or merger, the state must be free to intervene, either by vetoing a proposed transaction or by stepping in itself and asserting the rights of the community through an extension of public ownership."

In addition, there is one type of public ownership which Mr. Wilson has advocated with some persistence and energy; this is the establishment of state-owned enterprises in "growth points" of the economy, either as pilot plants or as competitors to existing private industry. The idea is not new and was much canvassed under the last Labor Government, without much being done about it. Much more would be heard about it under a Wilson administration. But it need scarcely be pointed out that such enterprises, whatever their other virtues may be, could only affect economic life at the margin, and certainly not enough to disturb the existing power structure of British industry.

The one concrete proposal that remains is the re-nationalization of steel. It is reasonable to think that had it not been nationalized under the last Labor Government, steel would be unlikely to figure in a Labor program. Bevan's insistence that steel should be nationalized, against the hesitation and reluctance of his colleagues, is one of his legacies to the Labor movement. There would be great difficulty in escaping a commitment which has been repeated again and again throughout the fifties. The battle which will develop after a Labor Government comes to power will not be whether to nationalize, but how, that is to say whether to do so in a maximum fashion, which could have important consequences, or minimally, so as to reduce the importance of the measure. And this is also one crucial issue where the outcome remains genuinely open, and largely depends on the distribution of forces within the Labor movement at the time.

For the rest, the conclusion is inescapable that Mr. Wilson, no more than Mr. Gaitskell (and no more than Lord Attlee) has any intention of committing the Labor Party and a Labor Government to any significant addition to the public sector of the economy. His aim and that of his colleagues is

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not to begin the difficult task of transforming a predominantly private enterprise economy into an economy with a predominantly socialized base; it is rather to *direct* private capitalism, to extend much further the scope of state intervention in economic affairs, to prod, encourage, bribe, admonish, cajole private interests into accepting and acting upon a Labor Government's policies. They want *dirigisme*; their ideal would appear to be a British version of the French *économie concertée,* in which private industry, labor, and the state would each play its part.

The Labor leaders are quite naturally perturbed at Britain's sluggish economic performance over the last decade, at the country's low rate of growth, at its falling share of world trade, at the inadequacy and misdirection of investment, at the waste of material and human skills and resources. They are well aware—Labor has always been aware—of the fact that contemporary capitalism *needs* state intervention on a massive scale. Nor are Conservatives oblivious to the need. The difference is one of emphasis and degree, but it is an important difference nonetheless: for the Conservatives are inhibited and therefore inefficient planners where Labor is eager to plan. What the Labor leaders claim is that they would administer the economy much more efficiently than the Conservatives. They may well be right. For there accretes around the Tory Party a multitude of vested interests, many of them of a purely parasitical kind, of which a Tory Government must take careful account, but towards which a Labor Government might prove less tender. Thus land speculators, large landlords, get-rich-quick finance may have a thinner time under a Labor Government than they have had in these last years, which should still leave them with plenty of fat. But Labor would be concerned to help and encourage those parts of capitalist industry which show enterprise and dynamism. It is in this sense that Labor, less paradoxically than might appear at first sight, may justly claim to be the friend and solicitous helper of "neo-capitalism."

If Mr. Wilson and his colleagues are to succeed at all in their aim of restoring vigor to the British economy, they will need the cooperation of private industry and finance. Such cooperation has a price. It always has had a price in the past

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and there is no reason to doubt that it will have a price in the future. Nor is there much doubt that Labor leaders, like their predecessors, will be willing to pay. This will take many forms: a "reasonable" attitude to key industrial and financial interests, a willingness, which Labor leaders have already shown to exist, to preach to the trade unions the virtues of moderation in presenting wage demands, a "sensible" attitude to tax reform, a generous appreciation of the requirements of an economy geared to and based on the profit motive.

The Labor Party, on the other hand, has already said that it wanted to see brought about a substantial extension of social services, a major extension of educational opportunities at all levels, new taxation on very large property and incomes—in short, that it wanted to reduce the social and economic inequalities which remain so obtrusive and characteristic a feature of British life, "affluence" notwithstanding. How to achieve all this *and* have the cooperation of industry; how to meet popular claims *and* respect the claims of property and privilege —this is certainly much more of a problem than Labor leaders have so far been willing to acknowledge, while to solve the problem to popular advantage may require a good deal more toughness, boldness, and determination than Labor has displayed in the past, or than it is willing to display now.

For it remains as true now as it was in the bad old days that the Labor Party is *not* speaking boldly to its potential and actual supporters, that its message does *not* conjure up a vision of great things greatly done, that it is still desperately concerned to establish its respectability, that it is still obsessively fearful of appearing too unorthodox. This has its comic as well as its serious side; asked in an interview how much he had been influenced by Marx, Mr. Wilson finds it expedient to reply, "Not at all. I've studied the subject as history; you can't begin to understand the Russians without it. But quite honestly, I've never read *Das Kapital.* I got only as far as page two—that's where the footnote is nearly a page long. I felt that two sentences of main text and a page of footnote were too much" (*The Observer,* June 9, 1963). This from a man who is not only a clever politician, but intelligent and highly educated. After re-

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sisting the trend for a long time, the Labor Party has now placed the responsibility for its pre-election campaign in the hands of professional advertisers and public relations men. The least that may be said about their efforts so far is that socialist education would not seem to be uppermost in the minds of these gimmick merchants. Nor, to be fair, does it seem to be a major preoccupation of their clients.

The ambiguity which is still as characteristic of Labor's message as ever does not appear to match the mood of discontent and the urge to renewal which is now felt in Britain, nor does it meet the challenge and the opportunities presented by the Conservatives' present bankruptcy and decrepitude. Recoil from Toryism has not been accompanied by any great enthusiasm for Labor. A whole new postwar generation has now come on to the scene, encouragingly free from deference towards the Tory Establishment: the wave of satirical writing and entertainment which has swept over Britain in the last few years is a young people's affair. But it is significant and even ominous that the bitter contempt which is at the core of their satire encompasses the Labor Party and its leaders as well as the Tories and their society. What, in effect, is being said by the most wide awake members of that new generation is quite simply that they don't see Labor leaders as a genuine alternative to their Tory opponents. It is much too easy to dismiss this as the typical irreverence of youth for its elders, or as simply mistaken. There is far too much in Labor's whole approach which makes these sentiments seem wholly plausible.

The same point may be made with even greater emphasis in relation to Labor's foreign policy. Here too, Mr. Wilson has been at pains to stress that he stands by the policies which he inherited, nor is there so far any reason to think that either he or his immediate colleagues nurse any ambition to depart from the set of principles which have guided Labor foreign policy in the last decade, indeed since 1945. They remain wholly dedicated to NATO and the Atlantic Alliance and they would appear to shun any autonomous and independent initiatives. In fact, it is not too much to say that President Kennedy has no more faithful allies in Europe today. As mentioned before, the

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Labor leaders are now free from their previous commitment to an "independent" British nuclear force; and they have said, again and again, that their main concern in relation to NATO was to strengthen Britain's contribution in "conventional" forces. True, the Labor Party has long advocated certain initiatives on the part of the alliance; it has, for example, subscribed for many years to disengagement in Central Europe, as a variant of the Rapacki Plan; it wants more frequent Summit Conferences; it would press for more energetic efforts to achieve general disarmament; and Mr. Wilson, who won his spurs as a young Minister in trade negotiations with the Soviet Union, might be expected to seek a substantial extension of trade with the Communist world. So far, however, Labor's hopes and demands in foreign affairs have been conditional upon their acceptance by the United States. Mr. Gordon-Walker expressed this fact with pellucid clarity in Washington in June of this year, when he told correspondents at the end of his visit "that the Labor Party would honor any agreement on participation in the multilateral force concluded by the Conservatives, and indeed that if the United States would brook no alternative Labor would itself accept the idea" (*The Times,* June 3, 1963). Such sentiments are not the stuff of which important initiatives in foreign policy are made. Not all Labor leaders would necessarily be as pliable and accommodating to American views as the "Shadow" Foreign Secretary. Mr. Wilson himself has said quite categorically that he was opposed to West Germany having a share, direct or indirect, in the possession or control of nuclear weapons; and he has also spoken of the "factual" recognition of East Germany. Even so, there has been little sign so far that the Labor leaders would go very far in their resistance to American pressure and policy. What they might well be expected to do is to try and "restrain" their American allies from impetuous action in some crisis or emergency, such as the crisis over Cuba in October 1962. But this falls rather short of independent action, and has of course nothing in common with "third force" politics, let alone neutralism. Labor leaders have shown much sympathy for the "third world": but this does not entail any interest in nonalignment for Britain. In the endemic conflict

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between the Communist and the capitalist worlds, Mr. Wilson and his colleagues may be expected to remain firmly aligned with the United States.

What all this suggests is that it would be a mistake to expect the next Labor Government to engineer deep structural changes in Britain, or to embark on new foreign policies. This, however, is not quite the whole story. For what a Labor Government does or does not do does not only depend upon its own wishes and predilections. Much must also depend upon the pressures to which it is subjected, in this instance pressure from within the Labor movement. The Labor left, in the trade unions, in the constituencies, and in the House of Commons, from whom pressure must mainly come, has seldom been as quiescent as now. One reason for this is that major issues of contention within the Labor Party have been temporarily shelved: "unity" is now the order of the day, the more so since the Labor left finds Mr. Wilson a much more acceptable leader than his predecessors, and one more likely to show willingness to listen sympathetically to its viewpoint.

However that may be (and the Labor left is traditionally prone to illusion in these matters) it is evident that the only real guarantee of an attentive hearing lies in what strength the left is itself able to muster. Nor should present quiescence obscure the left's potential strength. It is scarcely too much to say that its effective use of that strength is the one hope that a Labor Government may be somewhat bolder than its present policies and pronouncements would tend to suggest. Even then, this would hardly bring the issue of socialist change on to the British political agenda. That issue will have to wait for one, and perhaps for more than one Labor Government to have come and gone.

Except for a few handfuls of romanticists, or sordid would-be profiteers, war spells nothing but toil, waste, sorrow, and torment to the vast mass of ordinary folk in every land. Why should this horror, which they dread and loathe, be forced upon them? How is it that they have not got the sense and the manhood to stop it? Nowadays the masses have the power in all democratic countries. —*Winston Churchill*

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COMMUNISM AS AN IDEAL

BY PAUL M. SWEEZY

The conception of a communist society in which all property is owned in common is, of course, an old one, dating back at least as far as Thomas More's *Utopia,* written early in the 16th century.* But what the world understands by communism today is almost entirely a product of Marxian thought and practice. For this reason, attention will be confined here to what may be called Marxian communism. To begin with, a terminological clarification seems called for.

The word socialism was first used around the beginning of the 19th century in France, and first in its present-day sense by the socialist sects in France and England during the 1820's and 1830's. The Owenites, for example, meant by socialism a society in which collective ownership of the means of production is substituted for private ownership, and that is what most people regard as the *differentia specifica* of socialism today. But during the later 1830's and the early 1840's, writers calling themselves socialists of one sort or another came forth with a great variety of schemes, all intended to improve or perfect the human condition but differing so widely about the means to be employed that anyone seeking to define socialism in that period would have been hard put to it to find any common core of meaning to the numerous "socialisms" of the day. It was at just this time

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This is the text of a lecture delivered at the School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University. The school is located in Washington and trains future U.S. diplomats and others preparing for a career in international affairs.

* Most historians of the subject would trace the origins of communist doctrine to the world of classical antiquity, citing Plato and the Essenes as outstanding protagonists. Plato's "communism," however, rested on a basis of slavery; and the Essenes were a religious sect preaching withdrawal from the world rather than its reform. Doctrines and movements like these, while recurring from time to time prior to the 16th century, can hardly be considered true forerunners of modern socialism and communism.

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that Marx and Engels came on the scene. Feeling a need to differentiate themselves from the various existing schools of socialism, they adopted the label communist. The famous document issued on the eve of the revolutions of 1848 was thus the Communist Manifesto, not the Socialist Manifesto.

Subsequently, however, as Marxism rose to dominance among the radical tendencies of the day, the word socialism returned to favor and came to be more and more identified with the Marxian conception of the society of the future. So it came to pass that by the time national parties came into being in the 1870's and 1880's, most of them called themselves socialist or social democratic and proclaimed their goal to be socialism—a state of society in which private property in the means of production has been replaced by public ownership, and the guidance of production by prices and profits has been replaced by planning. Marx and his followers, however, did not hold the view that history would stop with the establishment of socialism. Socialist society would undergo development and evolution and would eventually be transformed into a higher form of society which was now given the old name of communism.

Thus before the end of the 19th century, the two words had acquired fairly generally accepted meanings: socialism was the first or lower stage of the collectivist society which would take the place of capitalism; communism was the second or higher stage. From the Marxian point of view, therefore, communism must be thought of as growing out of socialism just as socialism grows out of capitalism; and to understand the sense in which communism is the goal of the whole movement, one must view it not as an abstract utopia but as the end product of an historical process which has to be treated as a continuous whole. What this end product will be like and why it is regarded as an ideal worth striving for are therefore questions that can best be answered in a step-by-step fashion. First, let us inquire in what respects socialism represents an advance over capitalism, and then proceed to a consideration of the further transformations which socialism is expected to undergo on the road to full communism.

As already noted, the *differentia specifica* of socialism as

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compared to capitalism is public ownership of the means of production. This does not mean *all* the means of production: what it does mean is that those branches of the economy which are *decisive* for its functioning must be in what is nowadays often called the "public sector." There is no general rule for determining exactly what must be included, the branches which are to be considered decisive varying in different economies at different stages of development. To take an example, one might hazard the guess that in the United States today the socialization of all corporations with assets of a million dollars or more would amply suffice to bring the economic levers of command into the hands of public authority. It is worth noting that this would leave several million private enterprises and wide opportunity for anyone to set up a business of his own. The only requirement would be that it must remain a small business; if it grew beyond a certain point it would automatically "graduate" into the public sector. And of course all the big corporations, which dominate U.S. economic life and which are already collectives in all but name (though still run by and for private individuals and groups), would have to be transferred to the public sector from the outset.

Socialists believe that this transfer of the levers of command from private to public authority will make it possible to eliminate the major economic evils of capitalist society. Evidently, the guiding principle of the managers of firms and industries can no longer be to maximize the profits of the enterprises for which they are responsible. The public sector—and, since it is assumed to be dominant, this means the whole economy as well—must be governed by an economic plan, and each enterprise must be given a specific role in the plan. The goal of managements must then be to fulfill, and if possible overfulfill, the targets set for them in the plan. Success (or failure) with all its consequences is judged accordingly, just as under the present system success (or failure) is judged by the yardstick of profits (or losses).

Nota bene that while this arrangement does away with production for profit (in the public sector), it does *not* by any means eliminate what is often called the profit *motive,* which

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economic theory since long before the time of Adam Smith has rightly regarded as the mainspring of economic activity. When we speak of the profit motive, we mean simply that those who engage in economic activity are moved primarily by the desire to reap as large a material reward as possible, and this of course applies not only to the owners or managers of capital but also to workers and farmers and lawyers and professional baseball players. Each has his job to do, and each expects that the better he does it the more he will be paid. It is this expectation that motivates him to work efficiently and hard. There is nothing in the nature of socialism that conflicts in any way with the continued operation of the profit motive in this sense. What changes is only the definition of the jobs of the managers, not the motives which lead them to strive for optimum performance. In General Motors, the president is selected and paid well if he contributes to the profitability of the company; under socialism, the head of the automobile industry will be selected and paid well if he contributes to the fulfillment of the industry's part of the plan. As we shall see, in the Marxian view it is the retention of this material-gain incentive system that more than anything else marks socialism as the first or lower stage of collectivism and differentiates it from communism, the higher stage.

What, then, are the weaknesses and evils of capitalism which it is expected will be removed or cured under socialism? A full list would be long, much too long to be included in the brief space available here. But we can note those which socialists regard as of the greatest importance.

1. *Exploitation of man by man.* Socialists believe that the wealth and income of society are produced by the collective labor of society, and that the existence of a class of owners which reaps far more than a proportionate share by virtue of its ownership and without the necessity to work is *ipso facto* proof of exploitation of workers by owners. The results of this are very far-reaching, going way beyond the extreme inequality of incomes to which it gives rise. All of history shows that exploitation inevitably divides society into hostile classes and degrades not only the exploited but also the exploiters. In such a society,

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human brotherhood and solidarity are mere empty slogans impossible of realization. Seeing each other as means rather than ends, human beings become alienated, hostile, and embittered. Socialists consider that overcoming this tragic human condition, which has persisted in various forms for so many millenia, is the first and greatest achievement of socialism.

The abolition of exploitation does not imply the end of all income inequality. The material-gain incentive system, which still characterizes socialism, presupposes and requires differentiated incomes for different kinds and intensity of work. But the extreme and demoralizing forms of income inequality which are such prominent features of capitalism will definitely be done away with. These owe their existence on the one hand to private ownership of the means of production and on the other hand to the destitution which comes from chronic unemployment. As we have already noted, abolition of private ownership of the means of production is of the very essence of socialism, and it will be argued presently that in a comprehensively planned economy there can never be any reason for unemployment as a massive and persistent phenomenon. It follows that a much greater degree of material equality will exist under socialism than under capitalism.

2. *Economic instability and unemployment.* Even when it is performing at its best, capitalism is subject to booms and busts which take a frightful human toll in terms of insecurity and enforced idleness. At other times, as during the 1930's and to an increasing extent in the last few years, a condition of chronic stagnation and continuing mass unemployment is superimposed upon the normal ups and downs of the system. All of this is due to the anarchy of the capitalist market in which millions of individual units make decisions without knowledge or thought of the effect on the whole, to the concentration of wealth in the hands of a few while the great majority are poor, to the planlessness of saving and investment when all decisions are made with a view to private gain rather than public welfare. These are, of course, precisely the conditions and aspects of capitalism which not only can but must disappear with the adoption of a system based on public ownership and planning. Full employ-

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ment of human and material resources can be planned for and maintained at all times, and the savings-and-investment process can be so geared as to yield a high or low rate of growth according to society's needs. In the world of today, in which most countries are underdeveloped and most peoples hungry, it is usually taken for granted that something close to the maximum attainable rate of growth is an obvious desideratum. To the extent that this is so, socialism can provide it. What is required is simply a pricing policy which will yield large "profits" to the publicly owned enterprises, and an investment plan which will channel these funds back into expanding society's powers of production. But it should not be overlooked that the planning mechanism is equally adapted to the implementation of entirely different economic policies. Suppose, for example, that a socialist society has built up its productive apparatus to a point where all reasonable needs can be satisfied and it is desired to shift production away from further investment and into rapidly increasing consumption. There are two chief methods which the planners can follow: first, they can lower prices, which will have the effect of reducing "profits" and raising the real incomes of consumers; and second, they can spend a smaller proportion of public revenues on investment and a larger proportion to satisfy society's collective consumption needs (education, recreation, conservation, etc.). Nor is there any reason why automation and other methods for increasing the productivity of human labor should carry with them a threat of unemployment. If, for example, productivity were rising at a rate of x percent a year and further increases of per capita income were not desired, it would only be necessary to reduce hours of work by x percent. The problem for a socialist society in this situation would be to educate its citizens to put their increasing free time to socially and morally worthy purposes. Some socialist thinkers—for example, the eminent British scientist J. D. Bernal —envisage a time when education will be a lifelong process, with more and more of society's human energies being withdrawn from productive pursuits and devoted to teaching on the one hand and studying and learning on the other. But these are more likely to be problems of the higher (communist) stage than of the lower (socialist) stage.

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3. *Neglect of public needs.* It has always been true that capitalism has neglected the needs of society which can only be satisfied collectively, but this situation becomes particularly obvious and painful in a society like that of the United States today where education is neglected, resources are wantonly wasted, cities are allowed to turn into slums, and the people's health is left to the whims of private enterprise—while at the very same time a flood of trivial or even harmful goods and services is thrown upon the market, industries operate at 70 to 80 percent of capacity, and unemployment (by the admittedly inadequate official count) averages 6 or more percent of the civilian labor force. This is the ironically named "Affluent Society" in which the private wealth of the privileged stands starkly opposed to the indigence of the many and the neglect of all. Under socialism, by contrast, the pressures to concentrate on private trivia and to neglect public essentials are removed: at long last society can satisfy its collective needs directly from the publicly owned and appropriated surplus of its collective labor.

4. *Finally, the debasement of values and tastes.* As a capitalist society develops and enters the stage of "affluence," it becomes increasingly difficult to dispose of a growing surplus which is appropriated and owned by a relatively few individuals and groups caring only for their own narrow private and class interests. As a result, more and more resources are poured into a burgeoning sales effort. This sales effort, in turn, becomes the dominant factor in shaping the popular culture. The senses and sensitivities of human beings, their intellect and passions, are twisted and manipulated to the service of profitable sales—sales of ever-changing automobile models, of soap powders, of dog foods, of patent medicines and hair creams, of a thousand and one things that people may or may not need but which in any case should serve them as human beings, not dominate their lives and shape their minds. Under socialism, mercifully, this sales effort, multiplying and spreading like an uncontrolled cancer, dies a natural death. There can *never* be a problem of shortage of demand under socialism. Planners can *always* cut prices to clear a market if too much has been produced, and

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they can *always* divert resources to other uses or withdraw them from production altogether if a smaller volume of production in the future is indicated. And under socialism, leadership in educating and shaping popular values and tastes—in literature, in the arts, in science, in entertainment—can be assigned to those to whom it naturally belongs—the writers, the artists, the scientists, the entertainers, in a word to the people who are equipped by training and experience and interest to exercise leadership for the good of the whole society and not for the sake of selling this or that gadget or nostrum.

Is it a mere unsupported conjecture that socialism can eliminate these grave weaknesses and evils of capitalism, or is the theory set forth above supported by relevant historical evidence? Evidently, this is much too large a subject to be explored within the confines of a brief lecture. I will, however, indicate my own view which is, I think, that of the great majority of socialists all over the world. We believe that on each of the issues selected for particular mention, the actual experience of the USSR and the other socialist countries of Eastern Europe and Asia lends strong confirmation to the theory. In the socialist third of the world, exploiting classes of capitalists and landlords no longer exist, and the extremes of inequality have been eliminated. There have been no cyclical depressions, no stagnation of production, no mass unemployment. Collective consumption —especially in the fields of education and health—has been enormously increased relative to private consumption. And public morals and standards have been steadily if slowly raised, not lowered and debased by mass media of communication geared to the needs of the cash register. There is of course no implication that everything is perfect in the socialist countries, or that weaknesses and evils of other kinds do not exist. Quite to the contrary. Nothing is ever perfect in human affairs, and one has only to read critically what the socialist countries have to say about themselves to understand that weaknesses and evils still abound. What is maintained is that the specific weaknesses and evils which have been discussed above, and which have been associated with capitalism wherever it has appeared, have either disappeared from the socialist world or are clearly of

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declining importance. *In these respects,* much has been achieved in a relatively short time and starting from a very low base. It would be legitimate to conclude from this experience, I think, that socialism in an already developed country like the United States could achieve much more in an even shorter time.

Let us now turn to the question of the advance from socialism to communism, remembering that communism presupposes socialism and is unthinkable except as a further development of forces and tendencies which are released and set into full motion under socialism.

The basic condition for the advance to communism is a tremendous increase in the productivity of human labor. Scarcity as it has existed in the world up to now—and as it has been taken for granted by the science of economics—must be perhaps not altogether abolished but at any rate greatly reduced. And of course this can be accomplished only as a result of a considerable period of rapid technological advance, improvement of living standards, rebuilding of physical environments, etc. These are, from an historical point of view, the specific tasks of the socialist stage. The transition to the communist stage will be gradual and may occupy a period measured in decades rather than years. It will be marked by fundamental changes, of which we may single out for mention the following:

(1) The attitude toward labor will change. This is not only desirable; it is also absolutely necessary for the functioning of an economy which has largely solved the problem of scarcity. If everyone enjoys an income high enough to satisfy all his reasonable needs—perhaps mostly distributed in the form of free goods and services*—very few will be motivated to work simply for the sake of earning money. They must work because they want to or because they feel it to be their social duty. In the communist stage, as Marx put it, "labor has become not merely a means to live but has become itself the primary necessity of

* Free distribution involves very substantial economies and can therefore make a not unimportant contribution to solving the problem of scarcity. Only think, for example, how large a part of the cost of telephone service at the present time is incurred because of the need to keep track of all calls, bill customers, and so on. If telephone service were free, all of this footless paperwork could be dispensed with.

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life."* But this implies very far-reaching changes in the character of the labor performed by most workers. Many categories of jobs must be eliminated altogether (e.g. coalmining and domestic service), and insofar as possible all jobs must become interesting and creative as only a few are today. The ideal situation, of course, is that everyone should find satisfaction and enjoyment in work. To the extent that this is an unattainable goal, everyone must perform a certain amount of labor as a social duty, just as at the present time in most nations the whole population, or some specified part of it, is subject to military service as a social obligation.

(2) Social divisions such as those connected with the different modes of life in city and country will be eliminated. This does not mean that everyone will live exactly like everyone else, only that living conditions, cultural opportunities, etc., will be equally favorable for all. Similarly, the great present-day social division between mental and manual labor will have to be overcome. In part, this can be achieved by the progressive elimination of many categories of manual labor and the proliferation of categories of mental labor—a trend which is already in operation—and in part it will require that at some time in his life everyone should participate in both kinds of labor.

(3) Distribution of income will not be according to productivity but according to need. Whereas in the socialist stage, the principle of distribution will be "from each according to his ability, to each according to his work"; in the communist stage, it will be "from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs." This is already touched upon in what was said above in connection with the necessity for a changed attitude toward labor, but it has to be emphasized and what it implies has to be spelled out. Above all, "needs" in this context must not and cannot be interpreted in what may be called the Madison Avenue sense of the term. In capitalist society, the consumer is supposed to "need" not only the necessities and comforts of life but also an infinite accumulation of luxuries —several motor cars, a town house and two or more country

* Karl Marx, *The Critique of the Gotha Program,* Sect. I.

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estates, a yacht, etc., etc. What prevents consumers from satisfying these "needs" is only a shortage of the necessary purchasing power. As productivity increases and incomes rise, presumably everyone will be able to satisfy more and more of his "needs": the capitalist's utopia would then be a society in which everyone lived like one of today's Texas oil millionaires. Actually, this whole conception is an absurd contradiction in terms. The lavish scale on which the wealthy live under capitalism is possible only because they are able to command, directly and indirectly, the services of a far more numerous class of relatively poor people. In addition, much of their consumption is what Veblen called conspicuous waste, designed only to advertise their wealth and to arouse the envy of their countrymen. In a society of equals—one in which everyone stands in the same relation to the means of production and has the same obligation to work and to serve the common welfare—all "needs" that emphasize the superiority of the few and involve the subservience of the many will simply disappear and will be replaced by the needs of liberated human beings living together in mutual respect and cooperation.

Perhaps it will occur to some of you that what I am describing is not so much a new society as a new human being—one who expresses himself through his work, recognizes his responsibilities to society, respects and supports his fellows, and wants only what he needs to live a cultured life in a civilized environment. Am I not saying that communism will come into being and will prove viable to the extent that it is a society made up of human beings of this description? Yes, I am saying that. But I am saying more than that too: I am saying that the evolution of socialism will in due course *create* such human beings and precisely in that way will transform itself into communism. The society and the human beings who compose it constitute a dialectical whole: neither can change without changing the other. And communism as an ideal comprises both a new society and a new man.

In closing, allow me to quote a famous passage from Marx's celebrated *Critique of the Gotha Program*:

> In a higher phase of communist society, after the enslaving

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subordination of individuals under division of labor, and therewith also the antithesis between mental and physical labor, has vanished, after labor has become not merely a means to live but has become itself the primary necessity of life, after the productive forces have also increased with the all-round development of the individual, and all the springs of cooperative wealth flow more abundantly—only then can the narrow horizon of bourgeois rights be fully left behind and society inscribe on its banners: from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs.

That was written nearly a century ago, but the intervening years have done nothing to dim its brilliance. Karl Marx's conception of the communist society of the future is still the most humane and generous perspective that has been given to a suffering world, and today there are many more millions than ever before striving to make it a reality.

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MILLS AND RADICAL POLITICS

BY LAWRENCE GOLDMAN

I think that Eugene Schneider's lucid discussion of C. Wright Mills (MR, February, 1963) helped to clarify the confused and often distorted question of Mills' relation to the American Marxist tradition.

However, I find myself in disagreemnt with one aspect of Professor Schneider's critique: his notion that Mills saw in the power elite "the only real opportunity to avoid catastrophe." There is no alternative to rule by an elite. Thus, the intellectuals' prime duty is "to educate the power elite to the consequences of their actions." Further, intellectuals should try to influence the "liberal" members of the power elite. Finally, Schneider argues that Mills felt that "rule by the power elite, dangerous as it is, may be preferable to rule by non-rational mass, open to the influence of demagogues."

In this view, there is little difference between Mills' politics and Arthur Schlesinger's. Mills would seem to be an angry but practical elitist who had no real faith in democracy and felt that intellectuals should accept the structure of American politics, despite its shortcomings, and function within it.

This is a distortion of Mills' position. It has its origin, I think, in Mills' dismissal of the classic socialist notion that the working class would be the historic agency of change in capitalist society. Mills was hardly an orthodox Marxist, but the question is not whether Mills put his faith in the working class; the question is, rather, whether he put his faith in the power elite.

As Schneider has shown, Mills was convinced contemporary American society is undemocratic. However, Mills did not feel the radical intellectual should accept such a society. In fact, the honest intellectual is, almost by definition, a dissenter. "If

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Lawrence Goldman is currently enrolled in the Writer's Workshop at the State University of Iowa and is working on a novel. He has written for *Root and Branch* and *Studies on the Left.*

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we are to act as public intellectuals," Mills says, "we must realize ourselves as an independent oppositional group." (*Causes of World War Three,* p. 156.) In addition to opposing the status quo, intellectuals must suggest radical alternatives to present-day Cold War policies. They must insist that the private corporation be dismantled, that the military be placed under strict civilian control, and that the war economy be converted into a peace economy. This program demands criticism of basic socio-economic institutions and continuous political action.

The basic premise of this program is that the power elite are "crackpot realists," dangerous and politically immoral men. It would be highly unlikely that the power elite would react favorably or even reasonably to such a characterization. As Mills observes, "so far as the powerful are concerned, such programs merely worry them; and much more than is generally supposed, they worry their satrap opinion makers and other supporting circles." (*Causes,* p. 155.)

Primarily, the radical must appeal to other intellectuals, "to smaller more alert publics." However, once intellectuals establish a common ground they should try to influence the unorganized mass, not the power elite. The mass could be transformed into a community of publics if they rejected the politics of drift and blind fate and tried to solve the basic political problems of their society. Mills did not regard this as a very likely possibility, but he would not have emphasized the importance of reason in political affairs or insisted on the need to control the cultural apparatus if he did not believe that the creation of a community of publics was a vital task for the radical intellectual.

Far from seeing the power elite as "the only real opportunity to avoid catastrophe," Mills felt the men of power are not reasonable or responsible. Their faults are not due to any defect in their character as such but to their position in the institutional structure of American society. Such men cannot be "educated to the consequences of their actions." Hence the radical intellectual can have no significant influence on the ruling circles. His main task is to criticize and condemn the power elite for their irresponsible behavior.

Schneider's argument that Mills felt rule by the power

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elite is preferable to rule by non-rational masses is confusing. Certain thinkers have feared the masses and regarded them as the greatest danger to a democratic society. These thinkers believed that it is possible for the masses to function as an autonomous force in politics. This was never Mills' position. According to him, the masses are not autonomous; fundamentally they are the creatures of the power elite. Their actions are based on what they see, read, and hear. These in turn are shaped by the cultural apparatus which is controlled by the power elite. If the masses follow demagogues, the demagogues themselves will serve the interests of the power elite or they will not last very long. It is not a question of one type of rule being preferable to another; only one type is *possible* in America—rule by the power elite.

Radicals, I think, should have a clear and precise idea of C. Wright Mills' basic stance. He felt that the only viable political attitude is total disaffiliation and radical dissent from the status quo. Men of power are politically immoral, and intellectuals should neither compromise with the higher circles nor support them.

Finally, Mills did not believe the power elite is the only hope. He was not an elitist but an intense democrat who believed in the great egalitarian ideal, the community of publics. This ideal is the best hope for America, and Mills insisted that the radical intellectual must take the responsibility upon himself and point the way. As he wrote in the *Causes of World War Three,* "Each of us, in brief, ought to act as if he were—all by himself, if need be—a political party." (P. 156.)

If the United States wants to acquire a position of moral leadership in the world, if the United States wants enough prestige to rally United Nations votes for humanitarian democratic causes in the days ahead, we must become the protagonist of independence for all peoples. There is no growth in democratic traditions unless there is a chance to develop them. There is no opportunity as long as the people do not exercise the franchise. The principle of "the consent of the governed" is distinctly American and should be our world-wide slogan.

—*Justice William O. Douglas, The U. S. and Revolution*

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WORLD EVENTS

By Scott Nearing

Assembling the Bare Bones

Europe's robber barons, counts, dukes, princes, and kings evolved into the robber nations of the 15th and 16th centuries and the robber empires of the 18th and 19th centuries. The overall task of these political competitors was to subjugate and plunder each other. In the later stages of their advance toward "world powers" they added a second absorbing occupation: discovering, occupying, plundering, and exploiting weaker peoples.

The latest era of Europe's in-fighting began in the middle of the 19th century. It included dozens of minor wars and two major bloodbaths, one of which began in 1914, the other in 1939. At the conclusion of each war, minor or major, frontiers were redrawn and property changed hands.

Among the chief results of these incessant orgies of destruction and mass murder were bitterness, hatred, and the thirst for revenge, and on the other hand, the uncertainty, insecurity, anxiety, and fear that have obsessed European nationals through recent centuries.

Losses in the 1939-1945 struggle were so stupendous that the nations of Western and Central Europe staggered back from the catastrophe with empty treasuries, depreciated currencies, and depleted reserves.

United States political leaders remained aloof from the military struggle until 1941, while Big Business profiteered by dealing with both sides. The conflict, which weakened Europe, strengthened and enriched the United States. After 1945, therefore, the United States was able not only to underwrite the restoration of the European economy but to occupy the water and air approaches to Europe and establish in all of the chief countries of Western and Central Europe military bases garrisoned by United States armed forces. The chief reason offered to justify the United States military occupation of Western and Central Europe and their approaches was the "Interna-

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tional Communist Conspiracy" and the "perilous menace" of a Bolshevik occupation.

NATO was the political agency established and financed, largely by the United States, to protect the sovereignty of Western European nations and open the way for large-scale U.S. investments in European business enterprises. The sovereignty that NATO was designed to protect was quickly swamped by the Strategic Air Command, the Sixth Fleet, the State Department, and the CIA. Paralleling the Atlantic Community (NATO) was a vigorous movement to build a European Community with a common market and some form of pan-European political organization.

Two decades of recovery have restored the industrial productivity of the chief European nations and put Germany back where it was before 1939, as the most productive and best armed nation in Europe, except for the Soviet Union.

Meanwhile, the motive forces of competition, aggressive nationalism, acquisition, and accumulation which have dominated Western Civilization for the past five centuries are reanimating the chief powers, shaping their policies, and creating a new alignment: Western Europe versus the United States. This outcome is the inescapable result of a situation in which Britain, France, Germany, and Italy, only yesterday masters of world empires, found themselves political satellites of the United States, economically circumscribed and militarily occupied as part of the preparation for the American Century.

De Gaulle's France has headed the procession out of the United States-dominated Atlantic Community, closely seconded by a nervous, ambitious, eager West Germany. The alleged occasion for the walkout was the fumbled Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba and the clumsy brinkmanship of the Kennedy administration during the Cuban crisis of October, 1962. The real reason was the desire of the erstwhile sovereign big European powers to establish independence of U.S. suzerainty and gain foot room for a revision of the Potsdam Agreement.

The result: another confrontation in the capitalist world. On one side France and Germany, with probably Spain and perhaps Italy. On the other side such allies as Washington can

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muster, beginning probably with Great Britain.

Several notable differences separate the background of 1914 and 1939 from that of 1963. First, the European "powers" are the bare bones of 19th century empires, stripped of their colonies and seriously hampered by lack of essential resources, notably oil. Second, two of the three first-class powers in the world are partly or wholly Asian. None is based in Central or Western Europe. Third, the socialist world is a successful going concern. Fourth, Washington is preoccupied with a full-bodied revolution in Latin America. Fifth, aroused populations everywhere are fed up with two general wars in one generation and alarmed by the prospect of a nuclear conflict.

These new forces make it possible to have a local war between imperialists, which socialists may observe from a neutral distance.

African Unity

Europe is not alone in its struggle to bring order out of chaos, on a continent dominated by strident competitive nationalisms. Africa is larger than Europe geographically, and it is even more fragmented locally by tribalism and, continentally, by a long history of division by European empire-builders into arbitrary "colonial" water-tight compartments, many of which now serve as the areas of newly independent nations.

After ten days of meetings in Dakar, Senegal, foreign ministers from 32 African states faced an impasse on two key problems: the dissolution of African regional groupings and pan-African unity.

The controversy over regional groupings centered on the African and Malagasy Union, a league of fourteen French and Belgian colonial territories concerned with social projects. The Union has maintained close relations with Western Europe. The ministers "wished" that this Union would "melt gradually" into the Organization of African Unity.

For the Organization of African Unity, the foreign ministers selected Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, as the permanent headquarters and adopted rules of procedure for the organization. After a 15-to-15 vote, with one abstention, the conference

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failed to recommend a secretary general of the Organization for African Unity.

Winning independence for most of the 32 African states took time and militant struggle, but it was child's play in comparison with the formidable problem of building even a loose confederation of nations and peoples recently emerged from century-old colonial servitude, poorly manned, ill-equipped for independence, and subject to ceaseless pressures from their former political and economic masters.

Equal Justice under Law

Two hundred thousand people assembled in Washington, District of Columbia, on August 28, 1963, to demand equal justice under law for Negro citizens, who comprise about one tenth of the United States population.

Equal justice was denied Negroes when the Constitution of the United States was proclaimed in 1789, legalizing chattel slavery as a basic United States institution.

Equal justice was denied Negroes after President Lincoln issued his Emancipation Proclamation one hundred years ago, in 1863.

Equal justice was being denied Negro citizens in Washington while the two hundred thousand dominated the city on August 28th.

Equal justice is still being denied them weeks later, as these words are written.

The government of the United States of North America is the self-appointed leader of the "Free World."

"It is an affront to semantics and an example of outrageous mis-labeling to apply the term 'free' to the aggregate of oligarchies, monarchies, dictatorships, and despotisms which are masquerading under the name 'free world'." (Page 82, *Freedom: Promise and Menace,* written by the author of this World Events column and published by the Social Science Institute, Harborside, Maine, in 1961.)

Keeping the Goose Alive

South Vietnam, with an area somewhat larger than New York state and a population slightly less than New York City,

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is reported to be costing the United States Treasury about a million dollars a day during the summer and autumn of 1963. As Vietnam is a poor country, this million a day plays a very important role in the Vietnamese economy. It plays an even more important role politically, because South Vietnam's armed forces are trained, equipped, paid, and the monthly deficit in the South Vietnam budget is covered by these funds.

Every day Uncle Sam hands a golden egg to the South Vietnamese government, headed by Ngo Dinh Diem. In the postwar period (1945-1961 inclusive) Uncle Sam has handed out $1,440 million net to the South Vietnamese government. Only two other minor Asian governments have received like sums: South Korea—$3,056 million, and Chiang's government in Taiwan—$1,865 million. Aid to the whole of Latin America ($3,343 million), with its 200 million population, during the same period was little more than double the South Vietnam handout. Understandably, a highly unpopular government like that of President Diem of South Vietnam is not only financed by this huge Washington handout, but its very existence as a government is at stake. Without these golden eggs the Diem government would have been swept out of existence long ago.

Why is this lush subsidy going to bolster up an unpopular dictator in a far-off Asian country? For the same reason that other hundreds of millions are being poured into the empty South Korean and Taiwan treasuries. In all three cases (South Vietnam, South Korea, and Taiwan) a people has been politically divided. In all three cases, the northern segment (North Vietnam, North Korea, and People's China) is stabilized and making spectacular advances in the direction of socialism. In all three cases, the southern segment (South Vietnam, South Korea, and Taiwan) has a stagnant economy and an empty treasury, propped up and replenished by Uncle Sam's golden eggs. Between 1945 and 1961 these three bankrupt Far East governments received $6,361 million under a program aimed at the containment and destruction of Communism in the Far East. (All figures from *Statistical Abstract*, 1962, pp. 866-867.)

Under this program, handouts to bankrupt Far Eastern governments are in direct proportion to the "Communist menace." The greater the menace, the larger the handouts.

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If the "menace" disappeared, the handouts would cease.

It is against this greatly simplified Far East Asia background that we must read a *New York Times* News Service story by Thomas P. Ronan, printed in the *Bangor Daily News* of August 31, 1963. The story is based on statements made by Lieutenant Colonel John Paul Vann, recently returned from a tour of duty in the Mekong Delta, South Vietnam, where he was the senior American officer. Colonel Vann, who lives in Denver, Colorado, was awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross and the Purple Heart and was recommended for the Legion of Merit while in South Vietnam. He was also given the highest efficiency rating.

Colonel Vann stated that he and other "lower level" American officers serving in Vietnam "doubted whether the South Vietnamese government was really interested in defeating the Viet Cong Communist guerillas. . . . The government might be interested in 'containing' the Communists rather than defeating them."

Colonel Vann gave two reasons for believing that the government of South Vietnam might prefer not to crush the Viet Cong. His first reason was that the defeat of the Viet Cong by a United States-backed drive might result in a popular revolt that would oust the Diem government. His second reason: the Diem government "believed there would be a substantial reduction in U.S. aid when the danger from the Communists ended."

The Vietnam war, part and parcel of the Truman-Eisenhower-Kennedy policy in the Far East, is keeping the Diem dictatorship afloat. It has no other reason for existence and, like all small wars, it may be transformed overnight into a general military conflict. Twelve thousand United States military personnel are in Vietnam, risking life and limb and helping to squander a million a day of taxpayer money; Vietnamese are being killed or cooped up in concentration villages; and the world lives in daily danger that this brush-fire war may become a conflagration, in order to support a discredited, unpopular, bankrupt government that would be rubbed out overnight if the Viet Cong enemy were destroyed.

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(*continued from inside front cover*)
of expecting the appeal in September and respond to it more promptly than they used to. If so, the higher early returns may not be an accurate indicator of the final results of the appeal. We hope that this is not the case, but it is you who will decide. If you have been a contributor in the past, we hope you will raise the amount this year. If you have not joined the Associates before, we hope you will do so now.

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Volume 14 of MR (May, 1962, through April, 1963) is now available in bound form. The price of this and other bound volumes will be found on page 352 of this issue.

Dr. Harry F. Ward, who for more than half a century has stood in the forefront of the struggle for a better America in a better world, will be 90 years old on October 15. We extend to him our congratulations and best wishes for many happy returns. Many MR readers, we are sure, will be in the audience at Carnegie Hall on the evening of the 15th when friends and admirers of Dr. Ward from all over the world will pay tribute to him.

There exists in the United States today a sort of academic underground made up of students and teachers who reject the status quo, talk privately about the necessity for fundamental change, and yet do not see any meaningful way to participate *as intellectuals* in a movement with fundamental change as its goal. Up to now, the explosion of the Negro liberation movement has not changed this unhealthy situation. There have been plenty of opportunities for action in support of the movement but, largely owing to the character of Negro organizations and leadership, almost no opportunities for participation as intellectuals. It is too early to be certain, but it seems possible that this is going to change in the near future. If it is to succeed, the Negro liberation movement will have to match its courage and militancy with fresh ideas and an ability to get them across to its own members and to the public at large. And that is and must be largely a job for intellectuals. It is encouraging to note, for example, that the new Freedom Now Party understands this need very well, which is one reason why we welcome its formation. From discussions with some of its organizers, we can report the following: The FNP wants to mobilize a "brain trust" at both national and local levels, in preparation for an informed and sustained raising of the real issues facing the United States today. FNP organizers and speakers will need periodic briefings and constant contact with the best available minds across the country. The leadership plans to publish a steady stream of popularly written but intellectually unassailable literature outlining the real nature and solutions of local, national, and international problems. FNP is being organized and will be controlled by Negroes, but the Party is definitely not racist. Its definition of freedom is all-inclusive, and no color line will be drawn against whites wishing to offer their talents, their services, their financial support, and their votes. Urgently needed are economists, sociologists, statisticians, political scientists, and others qualified to research and write on everything from Harlem slums to neo-colonialism in Africa and the conflict-of-interest investments of high government officials in sugar, bananas, and oil. If you are interested, write to Acting Chairman Conrad Lynn, National Committee for a Freedom Now Party, Suite 207, 81 East 125th Street, New York City. Or phone MOnument 2-0618.

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